



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8 June 1961



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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2. Dominican Republic: Colombia reluctant to join possible joint action against new regime. (*Page ti*)
 3. Brazil: Argument between Quadros and minister of war over arrest of opposition leader. (*Page tv*)

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5. Zanzibar: Arab extremist leader reiterates opposition to American space-vehicle tracking installation. (*Page v*)

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7. Arab ministerial conference: Foreign and defense ministers to discuss joint policy toward Israel. (*Page v*)
8. Morocco: Cabinet reorganization leaves absolute power of King Hassan unchanged. (*Page vi*)
9. Bolivia: State of siege proclaimed; key Communists arrested. (*Page vi*)
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[REDACTED] 25X1

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Dominican Republic - Venezuela - Colombia: President Lleras Camargo of Colombia, the Latin American President most closely allied with Venezuelan President Betancourt's efforts to promote multilateral action against the heirs of Dominican dictator Trujillo, now apparently feels that Betancourt is pushing too fast on the issue. Ambassador Briggs, on a special mission to Colombia, after conferring at length on 4 and 5 June with Lleras and his foreign minister, reported that the Colombian leaders had shared US and Venezuelan hopes that the extermination of Trujillo might be followed by a popular, democratically led uprising. However, the failure of such a movement to develop and the apparent success of "Ramfis" Trujillo in asserting his control have given Bogota "serious second thoughts." Colombian leaders doubt that "Ramfis" will change the old order and they feel that President Balaguer offers little hope of exerting liberal leadership. The Colombians, however, would now prefer to assess the internal Dominican situation further before giving consideration to tripartite military action with the US and Venezuela.

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Betancourt, in 6 June conversations with Ambassador Stevenson, again urged decisive action through the OAS. Such action would depend on the report from the special OAS subcommittee that left for the Dominican Republic on 7 June. Though Betancourt is confident that the subcommittee will find evidence of drastic violations of human rights, the current thoroughly intimidated state of the Dominican dissidents and the regime's efforts to put on a good show make this by no means certain.

Betancourt believes that after the report is received, at least 14 Latin American governments will support a vote in the Council of the OAS for intensified economic sanctions and that the US, Venezuela, and Colombia should then ask for more severe measures, including military action. If Colombia decides against participating in a military effort, Venezuela will "go it alone" with the US, he said. He is confident that a show of military force would be sufficient to bring about the ouster of "Ramfis" and associates, "because the armed forces do not want him." Betancourt added that if Balaguer should set up a

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joint military-civilian junta, announce a democratic program, and call on the Trujillo clique to leave, Venezuela would recognize the new regime. Such recognition would be contrary to Betancourt's policy unless Balaguer remained as constitutional president. The Venezuelan President repeatedly stressed the undesirability of unilateral US action.

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Brazil: President Quadros has directed Minister of War Odilio Denys to arrest Marshal Lott, defeated candidate in the 1960 presidential election, for granting a press interview on his political views. Denys is resisting the order because Lott insists he had not intended his remarks for publication and Lott's arrest would bring on a political-military crisis. Quadros' hostility to Lott has undoubtedly been intensified by remarks derogatory to Quadros reported in the interview such as, "I would not want to be minister to this peasant." The military are unlikely to attempt to overthrow the Quadros administration at this time, but the arrest of Lott would add to the dissatisfaction in the officer corps caused by Quadros' transfers and reassignments of officers associated with the previous administration. OK

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[redacted]

Zanzibar: [The previously reported reinforcement of troops in this British protectorate has led to an uneasy truce between the Africans and Arabs. Observers are concerned, however, that when the Arabs recover from the shock of the African attack, they will attempt retaliation. The British Resident states that he has no indications yet of "Communist troublemakers or property damage directed against Europeans," but he plans to place police patrols in rural areas and said he would try to provide protection for the American space-vehicle tracking project. Meanwhile, Ali Muhsin, the Arab extremist leader in the new coalition government, has reiterated his strong denunciation of the American Project Mercury installation by publicly saying, "We are determined to oppose this unless America can convince Russia and China of the innocence of the project."] [redacted]

[redacted]

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OK

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25X1

25X1

[redacted]

Arab Ministerial Conference: Arab foreign ministers and defense ministers will meet in Cairo on 10 June to discuss joint policy regarding Israel's nuclear development program,

OK

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[redacted]

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its plans for diverting Jordan River waters, Jewish immigration into Israel, and the Palestine refugee question. The conference, which follows a meeting of Arab military commanders in late April, is part of a stepped-up effort during the past few months to achieve greater Arab unity, particularly on issues involving Israel. Because of inter-Arab differences, however, the conference is unlikely to result in firm agreement on coordinated plans. [REDACTED]

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Morocco: The cabinet reorganization of 2 June, which has been pending since Hassan II became King in February, involved no fundamental change in the complexion of the regime or in the status of Hassan as absolute monarch. The conservative Istiqlal party, whose president for the first time has accepted a post in the cabinet, has strongly endorsed the reorganization. The leftist opposition has labeled it a "continuation of the experiment with royal government which had already proven to be a failure." We do not expect that the leftists will take action at this time, however, against Hassan. [REDACTED]

OK

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*Bolivia: The proclamation of a nationwide state of siege on 7 June tends to confirm earlier reports that President Paz Estenssoro was planning a fake coup to justify arrests of opposition elements. The government has asserted that the Communists are attempting to seize power. Key Communist labor leaders in Catavi, location of Bolivia's largest tin mine, are among those arrested. Paz probably anticipates that this will facilitate implementation of the US-sponsored mine rehabilitation program scheduled to begin in early July. [REDACTED]

OK

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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

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- A. No change from last week.
- B. No change from last week.
- C. Except for the capture of Pa Dong by the Communists in Laos, there have been no significant developments in that

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[REDACTED] 25X1

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country, in South Korea, or in Iran to change the main points of our recent conclusions on these countries. Specifically:

- In Laos, the Communists are continuing to delay implementation of an effective cease-fire in order to obtain political concessions;
- In South Korea, the new regime remains unstable, with relationships between its military command and the UNC still untested;
- In Iran, the continuing success or failure of the Amini government remains in question.

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Political Military Crisis Threatened in Brazil

A weekly Brazilian news magazine on 5 June published an interview in which Marshal Lott reaffirmed his denunciation of "tyrant" Fidel Castro and called Quadros "this lover of Castro," declared himself against the proposed establishment of a defense ministry on the grounds that it would create interservice friction, and attacked Quadros for authoritarianism. The interview was granted several weeks ago but not published because of Lott's insistence that he had not intended his remarks for publication. Decision to print apparently followed an argument between Lott and the magazine over the substance of his comments.

Quadros had previously indicated his intention to implement the policy of some years' standing which prohibits military figures from commenting on political matters. Lott is drawing pay as a member of the reserve. Earlier in Quadros' administration a reserve officer was disciplined, with War Minister Denys' consent, for making political comments. The arrest of the titular leader of the opposition on such grounds could stimulate congressional factions friendly to him to work toward impeachment of Quadros.

Arrest of Lott would increase unrest among high-ranking military officers who were ousted from key posts by the Quadros administration. These officers apparently drew up an unsigned manifesto presented to Congress by an opposition deputy on 6 June. The manifesto appeals to Quadros to eliminate discrimination in military appointments and is critical of the economic austerity program, but it does not endorse Lott's criticism of Brazil's present Cuban policy. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Situation in Zanzibar

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[The death toll in the rioting following the legislative elections of 1 June has approached 65. The great majority of the casualties were Arabs living in a heavily African section of Zanzibar town. Some 300 persons have been wounded and over 700 jailed. The British civil secretary has admitted in a press conference that the situation not only in Zanzibar town but throughout the islands is "unsatisfactory." Despite the prospect of election disturbances, the police were unprepared for large-scale violence. By 6 June, British authorities had flown in some 800 troops and 700 police from Kenya and Tanganyika.]

[A coalition government has been formed under the nominal leadership of Sheik Muhamed Shamte--president of the small Zanzibar and Pemba People's party--but Ali Muhsin, the leader of the Communist-infiltrated Zanzibar Nationalist party, is the real power.]

[Ali Muhsin, who has had close ties with Cairo, appears primarily interested in protecting the traditional dominance of the Arab minority of 50,000 among Zanzibar's 300,000 people--many of them recent African immigrants from the mainland. The Arabs are the most advanced of the protectorate's racial groups and are trying to entrench themselves in the civil service, police force, and other positions of influence.]

[Ali Muhsin has already declared that Zanzibar must become an independent republic before he will even discuss a possible federation with the East African mainland territories. He has strongly denounced alleged efforts by both Kenyan and Tanganyikan African leaders to interfere in Zanzibar's election, and since the election he has stated that his new government will take strong measures to control African immigration from the mainland and might expel voteless Africans already on the island. At that time he was scathing in his denunciation of Nyerere's government in Tanganyika, claiming it was "subject to neo-colonialist domination of West Germany, Israel, and the Catholic Church." Ali Muhsin has also indicated]

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[that Zanzibar would probably not remain within the Commonwealth after independence.]

[Although Ali Muhsin appears favorably inclined toward Communism, the ZNP's general secretary, Abdul Rahman Mohamed (Babu), is believed to have been the major influence in moving his party toward acceptance of Communist influence.]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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The Moroccan Government

Hassan, who continues to serve as his own premier in an essentially conservative political coalition, has solidified his position to some extent by eliminating from the cabinet several of the ministers who have differed most strongly with his policies. The addition of representatives from several minor political parties and the lack of a leader within the cabinet around whom potential dissidents could rally will further inhibit any real challenge to Hassan's policies.

The King has named no deputy premier, but his unpopular aide, Ahmed Reda Guedira, probably will continue to act as the King's deputy as well as function as minister of interior and agriculture.

By failing to name a foreign minister and by distributing responsibility for various aspects of foreign affairs to several ministers of state, Hassan has created a situation which promises even greater confusion in the conduct of Morocco's foreign relations.

The leftist National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP) will continue to be the major opposition to this government and to Hassan personally. The UNFP's membership is centered in coastal cities such as Casablanca and Rabat and is drawn largely from organized labor, intellectuals, and students. The large number of UNFP supporters within the civil service may be able to exercise an influence over routine governmental operations.

The main question at issue between the UNFP and the King is the establishment of a constitutional regime. The King is committed to the December 1962 deadline set by his father for the promulgation of a constitutional regime, and he is likely to come under increasing pressure to honor this commitment both from the left and from many conservatives who are as anxious to attain this objective as is the UNFP. The King, however, is

unlikely to agree to a constitution which seriously diminishes his authority.

The King probably now hopes to embark on economic and social development programs. Substantial progress seems unlikely in light of his record of erratic conduct of affairs and his tendency to substitute eloquence for action.

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

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The Treasury Department

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The Secretary of Defense

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The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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Commandant, United States Marine Corps

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